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Off-farm income has recently been incorporated into the analysis of technology adoption, 
due to its increasing share in total farm household income in the U.S.  Previous studies, however, 
found inconsistent results with respect to the impact of off-farm income on adoption of 
conservation practices. The contribution of the current study is to provide a conceptual model 
which shows that off-farm work has positive impact on adoption of capital incentive practices 
and negative impact on adoption labor intensive technologies. The results of multivariate probit 
regression confirms that adoption of injecting manure into the soil, which is a capital intensive 
practice, is positively and significantly impacted by off-farm work, and adoption of record 
keeping, which is a labor intensive practice, is negatively and significantly impacted by off-farm 
work.  
Introduction 
Livestock production has by-products such as nitrogen and phosphorous. Nitrogen is 
found in the environment and it is crucial for living organisms. However, ammonia and nitrate 
forms of nitrogen are dangerous to environmental quality since they can combine with other 
compounds and create environmental problems (Aillery, et al., 2005). Livestock production 
contributes to emission of nitrogen to water sources through the run-off or leaching of nitrogen 
in manure, which is spread on the field or through the leakage of manure storage facilities 
(Aillery, et al., 2005). Phosphorus content of animal waste is also a water quality concern 
(Environmental Protection Agency, 2006).  Phosphorus can reach surface waters through runoff 
from land application of manure and direct deposition (Environmental Protection Agency, 2006). 
Both nitrogen and phosphorus are important plant nutrients but in water sources they can cause 
  1over growth of plants, which causes the amount of dissolved oxygen required by other organisms 
to decrease, hence causing the death of living organisms in water sources (Aillery, et al., 2005).  
The National Water-Quality Assessment Program found that the highest concentration of 
nitrogen and phosphorus in streams occurred in basins with extensive agricultural production and 
high nitrogen and phosphorus concentration in these streams were mostly due to livestock wastes 
and manure and fertilizer used for crop production (U.S. Department of Interior, 1999). To 
minimize the pollution from AFOs, the U.S. Department of Agriculture and Environmental 
Protection Agency promote the adoption of Comprehensive Nutrient Management Plans 
(CNMPs) by AFOs. In general, a CNMP identifies the actions that will be followed to meet the 
nutrient management goals, hence the environmental goals (U.S. Department of Agriculture and 
Environmental Protection Agency, 1999).  Concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs), 
which concentrate animals, feed, manure and urine in the same land area, have been regulated 
since 1974 under the Clean Water Act (Gollehon, et al., 2001).
1 CAFOs are required to follow a 
CNMP (U.S. Department of Agriculture and Environmental Protection Agency, 1999). However, 
for AFOs that are not classified as CAFOs, adoption of a CNMP is voluntary. The practices that 
are included in a CNMP can be adopted without adopting the whole plan. Therefore, the current 
study will analyze the adoption of individual practices, which can be included in a CNMP, rather 
than adoption of a CNMP as a whole.  Increasing the voluntary adoption of these practices by 
AFOs requires the barriers to voluntary adoption be known by policy makers and extension staff. 
 
 
                                                 
1 According to EPA, the threshold for being considered as a CAFO is set by regulations based on the number of 
animals confined at the operation for a total of 45 days or more in any 12-month period such as 1,000 slaughter and 
feeder cattle, 700 mature dairy cows and 2,500 swine (Gollehon, et al., (2001)). This threshold varies for other 
livestock species. 
 
  2Adoption of New Technology and Off-Farm Income 
The seminal study by Griliches (1957) spawned the theory that analyzes diffusion of 
technology. Underpinnings of diffusion theory caused studies to focus on micro-level decisions 
and to develop adoption theory. Since there are many different factors that impact adoption of a 
new technology, the studies mostly analyzed a subset of factors and developed theories that 
combine this small set of factors and adoption behavior. Therefore, instead of a one big theory 
that explains all aspects of technology adoption, it is possible to see different theories that 
explain a part of adoption behavior.  While the early adoption theories focused on profitability, 
subsequent studies have found that farm size, risk and uncertainty, information, human capital 
and labor supply also affect adoption. 
  Off-farm work has become a significant source of income for farm families. Mishra, et 
al. (2002) report that, in the U.S., 71 percent of farm households had either the operator, spouse 
or both have off-farm work in 2002. Hence, the share of off-farm income in farm household 
income rose from roughly 50% in 1969 to 90% in 1999 (Mishra, et al., 2002).  The conventional 
thinking was that the off-farm work was a temporary source of income. However, Ahearn and 
El-Osta (1993) showed that farm families continue to have off-farm income throughout the year. 
Therefore, off-farm work permanently exists in the life of farm households. Farmers use off-farm 
work to avoid the income variability due to risk associated with farm income (Huffman, 1980; 
Barlett, 1986; Mishra, et al., 2002).  
  Given the importance of off-farm work to farm households, off-farm income has been 
recently added to the analysis of technology adoption. These studies can be analyzed in two 
groups. Some of the studies analyze the joint decision making of off-farm work participation and 
adoption of new technology and test whether these two decisions are done simultaneously, 
  3sequentially or independently.  Other studies analyze how having off-farm work impacts the 
adoption of new technology by incorporating off-farm work as an explanatory variable into the 
econometric analysis of adoption of new technology. The current study falls into the second 
group. 
The empirical results of previous studies and the study by Núñez (2005) showed that off-
farm income level of farmers has a significant impact on their decision to adopt new 
technologies. However, the way off-farm income affects the adoption decision is not clear. There 
can be two effects; 1) farmers with off-farm income have more financial capability to adopt new 
technologies, 2) farmers with off-farm income do not have enough time to adopt new 
technologies. Hence, depending on capital and time requirements of the technology, the off-farm 
income can be a factor that intensifies adoption or a factor that defers adoption. The previous 
studies did not have a behavioral model that distinguishes the two different impacts of off-farm 
income.  
The contribution of the current study is to provide a behavioral model that represents the 
impact of off-farm income on adoption of new technologies by providing the conditions under 
which capital intensive and management intensive technologies are more likely to be adopted. 
Analytical Framework 
 
  To represent the household’s voluntary decision regarding technology adoption, a 
household utility maximization model is constructed. The current model is extension of the 
agricultural household models by Huffman (1980) and Cornejo, et al. (2005). The household 
problem can be represented as;  
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where, U (.) is the utility function of the household, C is the consumption,  is leisure, E(.) is 
the level of environmental quality, which is an increasing function of amount of labor, , and 




The budget constraint is represented in equation (2).   is the price for the consumption 
good,   is the price for the farm output, Q is the farm output and W is the wage rate for the off-
farm work. r is the market interest rate and K is the capital for production activities. The time 
constraint is represented in equation (3). The total amount of time available for the household is 
24 hours.   is the amount of time provided for on-farm activities,  is the time devoted to 
off-farm work. For the current model both on-farm labor and off-farm labor are exogenous to 
model, to reflect that the situation that labor devoted to adoption of new conservation 
technologies is determined after on-farm and off-farm labor decisions are made. 
c P
q P
on L of L
The technology constraint is reflected in equation (4). Where, F(.) is the neo-classical  
production, which is an increasing function of amount of capital K, and amount of on-farm labor, 
. To maximize consumption, farmers will always produce at the level available by the 
technology; hence the technology constraint is always binding;  
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where equations (5)-(8) are the first order conditions for consumption, leisure, labor and capital 
for adoption of new technology. Equations (9) and (10) reflect that either the constraints hold 
with equality, hence the inside of the parentheses equal zero and the Langrangian multipliers λ 
and µ are non-zero, or the Langrangian multipliers are zero and inside of the parentheses are 
positive.  ,  ,  , are the optimal decision variables.  * C *
e L *
a L *
a K 1 U′,  2 U′,  3 U′ represent first order 
partial derivatives of the utility function with respect to consumption, leisure and environmental 
quality. 
  6  Either the assumption that farmers will always have a positive amount of consumption 
and leisure, or a strict concavity assumption of the utility function (i.e. logarithmic utility 
function), will lead equation (5) and (6) to hold with equality. Hence, the values of the 
Langrangian multipliers λ and µ are;
c P
U1 ′
= λ ,  2 U′ = µ . 
  The impact of off-farm income on adoption of two types of technologies; labor intensive 
and capital intensive are analyzed in two different cases. 
Labor Intensive Technology 
  In this case we assume there is a positive critical amount of labor, , that is required by 
the new technology. Hence, the necessary condition for a farmer to adopt the labor intensive new 
technology is   to be at least as big as the critical amount of labor required by the new 
technology. To show the impact of off-farm income on   we look at the case where only the 
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Equation (11) states that, at the optimum, the marginal utility from environmental quality will be 
equal to the marginal utility from leisure. To find the impact of off-farm income on the amount 
of labor devoted the adoption, we take the derivative of (11) and as only the time constraint is 
binding, only   are  assumed to be implicitly functions of ;  *
a L *
e L of L
                                                 
2 The strict concavity assumption of the utility function is used. Even an interior solution may not mean adoption as 
the solution may still be less than the critical value of the labor required by the new technology. The similar results 
can be obtained for a corner solution, if the strict concavity assumption is dropped.  
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Hence, as amount of off-farm work increases, the farmer devotes less labor to adoption of a new 
technology, hence decreasing the probability that the new technology is adopted. In the above 
equation, using the strict concavity of the utility function and the environmental quality function; 
the second derivatives of the utility function and the environmental quality function are strictly 





is positive due to the binding time 




Capital Intensive Technology 
  In this case we assume there is a positive critical amount of capital, , that is required 
by the new technology. Hence, the necessary condition for a farmer to adopt the capital intensive 
new technology is   to be at least as big as the critical amount of capital required by the new 
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Equation (14) states that, at the optimum, the marginal utility from environmental quality will be 
equal to the marginal utility from consumption. To find the impact of off-farm income on the 
amount of capital devoted the adoption, we take the derivative of (14) and as only the budget 
constraint is binding, only and  are assumed to be implicitly functions of ;  *
a K * C of L
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Hence, as the amount of off-farm work increases, the farmer devotes more capital to adoption of 
the new technology, hence increasing the probability a new technology will be adopted. In the 
above equation, using the strict concavity of the utility function and the environmental quality 
function; the second derivatives of the utility function and the environmental quality function are 
strictly negative, making the denominator negative. The sign of 
of dL
dC is positive due to the 
  9binding time constraint; hence the numerator is also negative, making the total effect of off-farm 
work on   negative.  *
a K
  The model leads to empirical hypotheses that will be tested using the data from a survey; 
1.  If the new technology is labor intensive, the farmers with off-farm work are less likely to 
adopt the technology than the farmers who do not have off-farm work. 
2.  If the new technology is capital intensive, the farmers with off-farm work are more likely 
to adopt the technology than the farmers who do not have off-farm work.  
To test the hypotheses (1) and (2), a multivariate probit model will be used. Model specifications 
will be introduced in the next section. 
Empirical Model 
 
  The previous studies that analyzed the impact off-farm income and adoption of multiple 
practices revealed the importance of separating off-farm work decisions of the farm operator and 
the spouse and using either bivariate or multivariate probit regression models.  
  Huffman and Lange (1989) examine the off-farm decisions of the husband and wife 
jointly. The main finding of this study is that the estimates of the explanatory variables are 
significantly different for husband and wife. Hence, studies that do not account for the 
differences in off-farm work participation of husband and wife will have serious specification 
errors (Huffman and Lange, 1989). For this reason, the current study will incorporate the off-
farm work of both the farm operator and the spouse. 
  Most of the empirical studies focus on either adoption of an individual practice within a 
multi-component technology package or adoption of the package as a whole (Khanna, 2001; 
Dorfman, 1996). The studies that analyze individual practices within a package, treat adoption of 
each practice as independent. The single equation estimation of adoption of individual practices 
  10within a package ignores the correlation among the adoption of inter-related practices (Khanna, 
2001; Wozniak, 1984). The correlation might arise from either the unobserved factors, which 
might impact the adoption of all the practices in the package, or the adoption of one practice may 
be conditional on adoption of another practice (Khanna, 2001; Dorfman, 1996). Khanna (2001) 
explains that when adoption decisions of inter-related technologies are modeled as independent 
single equations, the estimates for these single equations will be inefficient; hence the variance 
of the estimated coefficients will be large. 
  In the current study, the producers who have a comprehensive nutrient management plan 
are expected to adopt practices such as soil testing, grass filters and record keeping jointly. 
Hence, adoption decisions for the practices are expected to be correlated. Previous studies by 
Dorfman (1996), Wozniak (1984) and Khanna (2001) have used bivariate and multivariate probit 
models to analyze the adoption of inter-related technologies. 
  In general the adoption decision can be represented as; 
otherwise   0   adopted,   is   practice   if      1 = i y  
Hence, for the case of a single technology, the factors that impact adoption of the technology can 
be analyzed using univariate probit / logit models. In this case the probability of adopting the 
technology, conditional on the explanatory variables, can be represented as; 
) ( ) ,..., , 1 ( 2 1 XB G x x x y P k = =  
Where   are k explanatory variables and G(.) is the cumulative distribution function.  k x x x ,..., , 2 1
In case of the probit model, the standard normal distribution function is used for G(.) and for the 
logit model the logistic cumulative distribution function used for G(.) (Greene, 2003). 
  11  The bivariate probit model is reviewed briefly to clearly show the difference in the 
structure between the univariate model described above and the multivariate probit model. 
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The errors are assumed to have a bivariate normal distribution with expected values equal to zero 
and variances equal to one. The correlation between adoption of the two technologies is 
represented by ρ, the covariance between the error terms. If ρ is found to be significant, its sign 
shows the direction of the correlation (Greene, 2003; Khanna, 2001). 
  The multivariate probit model is the extension of the bivariate model mentioned above by 
adding more equations and by having the error terms have a multivariate normal distribution. 
Four technologies will be examined in this study and the econometric model is;  
otherwise,   0        adopted,   is   keeping   record   if    1       y ,
otherwise,   0                     adopted,   is  test  soil   if    1       y ,
otherwise,   0                adopted,   is filter    grass   if    1       y ,
otherwise,   0      adopted,   is   manure   injecting   if    1         y ,
4 4 4 4 4
3 3 3 3 3
2 2 2 2 2















  12Data 
  A mail survey of 3014 farmers, including both CAFOs and AFOs, was conducted in Iowa 
and Missouri in Spring 2006. Farmers were stratified by farm sales and by type of livestock. 
Farmers with farm sales less than $10,000 were not sampled. This eliminates most retirement / 
lifestyle farmers (Hoppe, 2006). In designing the survey, the methodology discussed by Dillman 
(2000) was followed. The questions were designed to learn whether farmers have adopted the 
chosen conservation practices and how the farmer’s and the farm’s characteristics impacted the 
adoption decision. The effective response rate for the survey was 37.4 percent. For the regression 
analysis, CAFOs are excluded from the data set to focus on factors affecting voluntary adoption.  
  The summary statistics for the data are presented in Table 1. The average age of farmers 
in the survey was 51. Fifty one percent of the survey respondents were from Iowa and the rest 
were from Missouri. Forty three percent of the survey respondents had a high school degree (the 
base category for the regression analysis). Seventy percent of respondents had off-farm income. 
Thirty five percent of the respondents had farm sales, which includes both crop and livestock 
sales, between $100,000 and $249,999 (the base category for the regression analysis).  About 83 
percent of the farmers indicated that they expect to continue farming at their current farm in the 
next 5 years and 54 percent of the farmers indicated that they expect to increase their livestock 
numbers. Only 18 percent of the farmers had an Environmental Quality Incentives Program 
(EQIP) contract through the Natural Resources Conservation Service.  
  About 14 percent of the farm operators had seasonal off-farm work and 22 percent had 
year round off-farm work. These numbers are 7 percent and 50 percent for the spouse, 
respectively. Only 19 percent of the survey respondents indicated that off-farm work interferes 
with the timing of the farming operations, while 50 percent answered no and the rest indicated 
  13that the question was not applicable to them. About 48 percent of the farmers hired non-family 
labor in 2005. 
  In terms of the practices used as the dependent variables in the multivariate probit 
regression, the adoption rate was 21 percent for injecting manure, 61 percent for grass filter, 72 
percent for soil test, and 37 percent for record keeping.  
Regression Results and Discussion 
  Four dependent variables used in the regression analysis were classified; injecting 
manure into the soil is categorized as a capital intensive technology since it requires specific 
equipment, using grass filter systems as a buffer around water sources is intermediate, record 
keeping is labor intensive, and soil testing is categorized as neither capital nor labor intensive. 
Since the current overall adoption rate is lower for injecting manure and record keeping, they 
have higher number of significant independent variables than grass filter and soil test. 
  The p-value of the Wald test statistic for overall significance of the regression is 0.00, 
which shows that the multivariate probit regression is significant overall. The multivariate probit 
regression results are given in Table 2. Some of the variables are discussed below. 
Age 
  Age represents the experience and innovativeness of the farmer, and also captures the 
differences in the present value of future income between younger and older farmers. The 
empirical results of previous studies show both positive and negative relationships between age 
and adoption of new technology. In the current study, age in years has a negative and significant 
effect on adoption of for grass filters and soil testing. This shows that younger farmers are more 
likely to adopt grass filters and soil test. Age is not significant for injecting manure and record 
keeping. 
  14Education 
  Education is assumed to provide skills to augment and use information, hence increasing 
the allocative ability of the individuals (Huffman, 1974; Wozniak, 1984). The allocative ability is 
the human’s ability to acquire and use information relating to the production technology (Welch, 
1970). Overall, Wozniak (1984) hypothesized that education enhances the innovative ability of 
individuals and leads to efficient adoption decisions.  
  Some of the previous studies on adoption of new technology found that the probability of 
adopting the new technology is increasing with level of education (Wozniak ,1984 ; Abdulai and 
Huffman, 2005 ). However, some of the studies did not find a significant relationship between 
human capital and adoption of new technology (Upadhyay, et. al., 2002 ; Soule, et al., 2000). 
Khanna (2001) found that adoption of soil testing is not affected by the education of the farmer. 
  In the current study, farmers with high school education are more likely to inject manure 
than farmers with some college or vocational education or farmers with graduate degree.  There 
was no significant difference for those with a bachelor’s degree.  For grass filters, farmers with a 
high school degree are more likely to adopt than farmers with some college or vocational 
education. Education is found to be insignificant for soil testing. However, for record keeping, 
farmers with a high school degree are found to be more likely to adopt than farmers with 
graduate degree and farmers with less than high school degree. 
  Finding high school graduates to be more likely to adopt a practice than farmers with 
education less than high school is consistent with the literature. However, finding high school 
graduates are more likely to adopt a practice than farmers with vocational or graduate education 
shows that factors other than innovativeness may be impacted by education. Also, it could be 
  15that education is more important when practices are complicated and most farmers indicated that 
they did not consider these practices to be complicated (Table 1). 
Off-Farm Work 
  If the farm operator has seasonal off-farm work, then the farmer is more likely to adopt 
injecting manure and grass filters than a farmer who has no off-farm work. Also, if the farm 
operator has year round off-farm work, the farmer is less likely to adopt record keeping than a 
farmer who has no off-farm work. For soil testing, however, it is found that, if the farm operator 
has seasonal off-farm work, then the farmer is more likely to adopt soil testing than a farmer with 
no off-farm work. The same result is found for the impact of the spouse’s seasonal work. 
  Comparison of the regression results with the behavioral model predictions reveals that 
there is support for the model in the cases of injecting manure, grass filters and record keeping. 
Hence, we provide evidence that adoption of capital intensive practices are positively impacted 
by the off-farm work of the farmer and adoption of labor intensive technologies are negatively 
impacted by the off-farm work of the farmer. Since, soil testing is neither capital intensive nor 
labor intensive, it is probably the case that factors other than income and time availability impact 
adoption of soil testing.    
Off-Farm Income 
  Off-farm income is found to positively impact adoption of practices that require financial 
sources. However, off-farm income is also assumed to be negatively associated with farm 
size/sales. This applies especially to the large farms requiring high management intensity, as 
high management intensity will require more on-farm work and leave less time available to off-
farm work. In the current study, farmers with an off-farm income level of $10,000-$24,999 are 
found to be more likely to inject manure and adopt grass filters than farmers with an off-farm 
  16income level of $25,000-$49,999. For soil testing, there is no statistically significant difference 
between the base category and the other off-farm income levels. 
Farm-Sales 
  Farm size has been included in the analysis of adoption of new technology due to its 
relationship with fixed investment cost, credit constraint, information cost and human capital 
(Feder, et al., 1985). The impact of farm size on adoption of new technology can be analyzed 
through its association with different factors; economies of scale in production; access to credit, 
and economies of scale in information costs. 
  Some of the early studies show a positive relationship between adoption of new 
technology and farm size. This result is attributed to economies of scale gained by large farms 
due to fixed costs of equipment (Khanna, 2001 ;Qaim  and de Janvry, 2003 ; Abdulai and 
Huffman, 2005). Barham, et al. (2004) found that adoption of rBST increases as the size of the 
farm increases, since the price of the rBST was high, only large farms could afford it. 
Participation in a conservation program and farm size is found positively related by Hua, et al. 
(2004) and Chang and Boisvert (2005).   The studies that found either statistically insignificant 
or negative relationships between farm size and adoption of new technology are mostly 
attributed to non-existence of economies of scale in the technology to be adopted (Soule, et al., 
2000; Khanna, 2001 ; Hua, et al., 2004).  
  In the current study, there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between 
adoption of injecting manure and farm sales level. Farmer with farm sales levels of $250,000-
$499,999 and $500,000 + are more likely to adopt injecting manure than farmers with farm sales 
of $100,000-$249,999. For grass filters and soil testing, farmers with farm sales of $10,000 -
9,999 are less likely to adopt than farmers with farm sales of $100,000-$249,999.  
  17Environmental Perceptions 
  Perceptions and attitudes of farmers about the environmental problem and the technology 
to be adopted have been incorporated into studies to examine the impact of environmental 
awareness and stewardship on adoption of conservation practices. Upadhyay et. al.(2002) 
mention that environmental perceptions will not result in action unless there are economic or 
other benefits. Previous studies found both positive and negative relationships between 
perceptions and adoption of conservation practices (Hua, et al. 2004 ; Upadhyay, et. al., 2002). 
   In the current study, it is found that the more the smell of manure bothers the farmer or 
his / her family, the more likely the farmer tests soil. The more the smell of manure bothers the 
farmer’s neighbor, the more likely the farmer adopts injecting manure. The more concerned a 
farmer is about the water quality of streams and lakes in the farmer’s county, the more likely to 
adopt record keeping, but the less likely to adopt injecting manure and soil testing. The more a 
farmer agrees that agricultural regulations regarding water quality will become stricter in the 
next five years, the less likely the farmer adopts injecting manure. The more transportation costs 
and time affect which of the farmer’s fields receive manure, the less likely the farmer adopts soil 
testing and record keeping. 
Perceptions about the Practices 
  There is a statistically significant positive relation between perceived profitability of the 
practices and adoption. The more a farmer agrees that the practice is profitable, the more likely 
the farmer adopts injecting manure, grass filters, soil testing and record keeping. Perceptions 
about improving water quality and being time consuming were found significant only for grass 
filters. The more a farmer agrees that the practice improves water quality, the more likely the 
farmer adopts grass filters. The more a farmer agrees that the practice is time consuming, the less 
  18likely the farmer adopts grass filters. A perception that the practice is complicated is significant 
for injecting manure and soil testing.  The more a farmer agrees that the practice is complicated, 
the less likely the farmer adopts injecting manure and soil testing.      
Conclusion 
  Results of the current study reveal that, to measure the impact of off-farm income on 
adoption of conservation practices it is important to know the capital and labor requirements of 
these practices. The behavioral model of the current study predicted that adoption of capital 
intensive practices is positively impacted by off-farm work, due to creation of extra income, and 
adoption of labor intensive technologies is negatively impacted by off-farm work, due to a lack 
of time.  The multivariate probit regression of injecting manure, grass filters, soil testing and 
record keeping supports the predictions of the behavioral model. 
Since the importance of off-farm income is expected to increase in the future, programs 
and policies to increase the adoption of environmental practices need to take this into account.  
Time to acquire information and perform practices is increasingly scarce.  For farmers with full-
time jobs, meeting with NRCS agents during the day is problematic.  EQIP and other incentive 
programs can help capital-constrained farmers but the application process is time-consuming and 
requires interaction with NRCS agents.   The design of new technologies should take into 
account the opportunity cost of farmers’ time as well as the out of pocket costs.   
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  22Table 1: Summary Statistics of Variables 
 
Variable N  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Range 
Age  912 51.87  11.33 23-93 
IOWA  919 0.51  0.5  0-1 
MISSOURI  919 0.49  0.5  0-1 
Education      
Less than High School  913  0.11  0.31  0-1 
High School (Base Category)  913  0.43  0.5  0-1 
Some College or Vocational School  913  0.28  0.45  0-1 
Bachelor Degree  913  0.16  0.37  0-1 
Graduate Degree  913  0.02  0.13  0-1 
Off-farm Income      
None 872  0.3  0.46  0-1 
$0 - $9,999  872  0.13  0.34  0-1 
$10,000-$24,999 (Base Category)  872  0.16  0.37  0-1 
$25,000 - $49,999  872  0.26  0.44  0-1 
$50,000 - $99,999  872  0.12  0.33  0-1 
$100,000 +  872  0.03  0.16  0-1 
Farm Sales      
$0 - $9,999  892  0.03  0.17  0-1 
$10,000 - $99,999  892  0.28  0.45  0-1 
$100,000-$249,999 (Base Category) 892  0.35  0.48  0-1 
$250,000 - $499,999  892  0.19  0.39  0-1 
$500,000  +  892  0.15  0.36  0-1 
Environmental Perceptions    
Smell of Manure Bothers Me or Fam.  903  2.6  1.1  0-5 
Smell of Maunre Bothers My Neighbors  895  2.8  1.1  0-5 
Not Sure How Crops Respond to Manure  892  2.1  1.2  0-5 
Concerned about the Water Quality  901  4.2  1.1  0-5 
Managing Manure Improves Water Quality  903  4.2  1.0  0-5 
Regulations about Water Quality will be Stricter  909  4.0  1.0  0-5 
Continue Farming in Next 5 Years YES  868 0.9  0.3  0-1 
Continue Farming in Next 5 Years NO (Base 
Category)  868 0.03 0.17  0-1 
Continue Farming in Next 5 Years NOT SURE  868 0.1  0.3  0-1 
Expand Livestock Numbers in Next 5 Years YES  850 0.3 0.46  0-1 
Expand Livestock Numbers in Next 5 Years NO 
(B. C.)  850 0.45  0.5  0-1 
Expand Livestock Numbers in Next 5 Years NOT 
SURE  850 0.24 0.43  0-1 
Perceptions about the Practice   
Inject Manure      
Profitable 816  3.51  1.29  0-5 
Improve Water Quality  807  3.87  1.11  0-5 
Time Consuming  794  3.26  1.20  0-5 
Complicated 792  2.81  1.18  0-5 
Grass Filter      
  23Profitable 830  3.55  1.26  0-5 
Improve Water Quality  836  4.33  0.96  0-5 
Time Consuming  812  2.79  1.22  0-5 
Complicated 807  2.48  1.15  0-5 
Soil Test       
Profitable 839  4.17  1.11  0-5 
Improve Water Quality  803  4.02  1.08  0-5 
Time Consuming  800  2.97  1.26  0-5 
Complicated 792  2.30  1.19  0-5 
Record Keeping      
Profitable 836  3.34  1.31  0-5 
Improve Water Quality  820  3.46  1.16  0-5 
Time Consuming  823  3.57  1.20  0-5 
Complicated 815  3.06  1.22  0-5 
Influence on Agricultural Decision   
Bank 884  2.3  1.2  0-5 
Contractor 879  1.8  1.1  0-5 
University 885  2.3  1.1  0-5 
NRCS 886  2.6  1.2  0-5 
Environmental Quality Incentives Program  921 0.18 0.39  0-1 
Manure Handling      
Solid Handling  902  0.58  0.49  0-1 
Liquid Handling (Base Category)   902  0.13  0.34  0-1 
Solid and Liquid Handling  902  0.26  0.44  0-1 
Total Animal Units  896 562.76  802.01  5-9800 
Species Dummy      
Dairy   905  0.2  0.4  0-1 
Beef Cow   905  0.2  0.4  0-1 
Beef Cattle   905  0.14  0.35  0-1 
Swine 905  0.27  0.44  0-1 
Poultry   905  0.07  0.25  0-1 
Turkey   905  0.11  0.31  0-1 
Other   905  0.02  0.13  0-1 
Contributes Significantly to Farm Work   
Farm Operator  904  0.97  0.18  0-1 
Spouse 751  0.57  0.5  0-1 
Other Family Member  921  0.41  0.49  0-1 
Off-Farm Work      
Farm Operator Seasonal  891  0.14  0.37  0-1 
Farm Operator Year Round  890  0.22  0.42  0-1 
Spouse Seasonal  748  0.07  0.26  0-1 
Spouse Year Round  747  0.5  0.5  0-1 
Hours worked Off the Farm (Including both those who work off the farm and those who don’t) 
Farm Operator  859  11.69  18.72  0-100 
Spouse 700  19.67  19.83  0-85 
Other Family Member  919  7.68  18.75  0-100 
Off-farm work interfere farm work YES  868 0.19 0.39  0-1 
Off-farm work interfere farm work NA  867 0.31 0.46  0-1 
Hire Non-Farm Labor Dummy  897 0.48  0.5  0-1 
  24Dependent Variables    
Injecting Manure  873 0.21  0.4  0-1 
Grass Filter  828 0.61  0.5  0-1 
Soil Test  811 0.72  0.4  0-1 
Record Keeping  869 0.37  0.5  0-1 
 

























Age  -0.09 0.29 -0.11  0.07 -0.24  0.00 -0.04  0.60 
Age^2  0.00  0.56 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.82 
Iowa  0.69  0.10 -0.13  0.56 0.53 0.05 0.28 0.31 
Education             
Less than High School  -1.55  0.02  -0.49  0.21  -0.33  0.48  -1.11  0.03 
Some College or 
Vocational  School  -1.04 0.00 -0.40  0.05 0.21 0.42 0.35 0.13 
Bachelor  Degree  0.13  0.71 0.06 0.80 0.15 0.64 -0.12  0.72 
Graduate  Degree  -6.67 0.00 -0.15  0.83 -0.25  0.66 -6.05  0.00 
Off-farm Income             
None  -0.13 0.83 0.15 0.71 0.35 0.49 0.43 0.32 
$0  -  $9,999  0.25  0.56 -0.32  0.33 -0.34  0.37 0.53 0.17 
$25,000  -  $49,999  -1.03 0.03 -0.45  0.09 -0.05  0.88 0.15 0.63 
$50,000  -  $99,999  -1.00 0.14 0.09 0.79 -0.56  0.22 -0.20  0.65 
$100,000  +  -0.62 0.59 -0.88  0.27 -0.99  0.13 -5.51  0.00 
Contributes 
Significantly to Farm 
Work             
Spouse  -0.19 0.55 -0.22  0.23 -0.18  0.45 0.06 0.77 
Other  Family  Member  0.05  0.85 0.40 0.02 0.18 0.44 0.00 0.99 
Off-Farm Work             
Farm  Operator  Seasonal 0.87  0.01 0.46 0.05 1.27 0.00 -0.05  0.84 
Farm Operator Year 
Round  0.50  0.32 -0.27  0.36 -0.08  0.85 -0.71  0.07 
Spouse  Seasonal  0.37  0.48 0.14 0.73 1.03 0.06 -0.26  0.60 
Spouse  Year  Round  0.20  0.65 0.07 0.81 0.37 0.26 0.03 0.91 
Off-farm work interfere 
Yes  0.18  0.66 0.80 0.00 -0.20  0.55 0.34 0.29 
Off-farm work interfere 
NA  -0.35 0.30 0.04 0.86 -0.38  0.18 -0.20  0.44 
Hire Non-Farm Labor 
Dummy  -0.16 0.62 -0.24  0.20 0.22 0.33 0.10 0.62 
Farm Sales             
$0  -  $9,999  -4.95 0.00 0.85 0.25 -0.11  0.90 2.01 0.00 
$10,000  -  $99,999  -0.16 0.73 -0.57  0.01 -0.48  0.10 0.40 0.17 
  25$250,000  -  $499,999  1.12  0.00 0.06 0.79 -0.29  0.32 -0.08  0.79 
Farm  Sale$500,000    +  2.08  0.00 0.56 0.12 0.09 0.86 0.12 0.73 
Environmental 
Perceptions             
Smell of Manure Bothers 
Me  or  My  Family  -0.15 0.41 0.07 0.49 0.26 0.04 0.04 0.70 

























Not Sure How Crops 
Respond  to  Manure  -0.11 0.50 -0.10  0.26 -0.15  0.15 -0.06  0.58 
Concerned about the 
Water  Quality  -0.42 0.02 0.04 0.68 -0.22  0.08 0.29 0.01 
Managing Manure 
Improves  Water  Quality 0.13  0.53 -0.10  0.43 -0.07  0.63 0.04 0.77 
Regulations will be 
Stricter  -0.47 0.01 -0.13  0.27 -0.16  0.16 -0.19  0.14 
Transportation Costs and 
Time Affect Which of 
My Fields Receive 
Manure  -0.18 0.11 0.02 0.73 -0.21  0.00 -0.22  0.01 
Continue Farming Yes  -0.25 0.73 -0.22  0.68 0.60 0.18 1.30 0.01 
Continue Farming Not 
Sure  0.12  0.89 -0.11  0.85 -0.08  0.89 1.41 0.04 
Expand Livestock 
Numbers Yes  0.17  0.65 -0.24  0.25 0.41 0.14 -0.33  0.19 
Expand Livestock 
Numbers Not Sure  0.24  0.46 -0.22  0.34 0.16 0.59 -0.23  0.40 
Perceptions about the 
Practice             
Profitable  0.86  0.00 0.37 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.54 0.00 
Improve  Water  Quality  0.27  0.24 0.23 0.05 0.07 0.54 -0.04  0.79 
Time  Consuming  0.14  0.29 -0.22  0.05 -0.14  0.17 -0.06  0.61 
Complicated  -0.29 0.06 0.02 0.86 -0.28  0.01 -0.08  0.53 
Influence on 
Agricultural Decision             
Bank  0.08  0.57 0.12 0.14 -0.02  0.84 -0.17  0.10 
Contractor  0.15  0.37 -0.08  0.42 -0.09  0.43 0.03 0.79 
University  -0.18 0.29 -0.05  0.67 0.23 0.03 0.12 0.28 
NRCS  -0.08 0.57 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.22 0.08 0.43 
EQIP  -0.62 0.16 0.07 0.78 0.45 0.17 0.03 0.91 
Manure Handling             
Solid  Handling      0.61 0.08 0.01 0.98 -1.73  0.00 
Solid and Liquid 
Handling      0.34 0.31 -0.24  0.61 -1.47  0.00 
Total AU  0.00  0.41 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 
  26Species Dummy             
Dairy    -1.80 0.00 -0.46  0.12 -0.09  0.83 -0.32  0.34 
Beef  Cow    -2.49 0.00 -0.41  0.19 1.48 0.00 -0.42  0.24 
Beef  Cattle    -2.51 0.00 -0.25  0.49 0.57 0.17 -0.70  0.08 
Poultry    -2.45 0.00 -0.90  0.08 -0.43  0.48 1.20 0.04 
Turkey    -1.74 0.00 -0.92  0.06 0.41 0.49 1.01 0.06 
Other    -1.09 0.03 0.25 0.63 -0.06  0.93 0.98 0.09 
Constant  2.09  0.45 2.70 0.13 5.45 0.03 -0.65  0.78 
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